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Abstract 
Theory of Mind (ToM) is a neurocognitive mechanism 
developed by natural selection to bear social complexity. In 
literature there is an agreement on the existence of a widely 
distributed neural network underpinning ToM, including 
right and left posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus (right 
pSTS and left pSTS), Precuneus, and Medial Prefrontal 
Cortex (MPFC). Although the prevalent view is that the 
MPFC is the key brain area subserving ToM, recently it has 
been argued that the role of the right posterior STS is more 
specific than the role of the MPFC for the attribution of 
mental states. In order to contribute to the scientific debate 
regarding the key regions of the ToM network, here we 
introduce a new theoretical distinction among varieties of 
intentions able to detail the role of these brain regions. 
 
Varieties of prior intentions 
In philosophy of mind there is a conceptual difference 
between prior intention and intention in action. Searle 
(1983) defines prior intention as an initial representation 
of the goal of an action prior to the initiation of the 
action; this kind of intention is formed in advance. In 
contrast, an intention in action is the proximal cause of 
the physiological chain leading to overt behaviour. In 
cognitive neuroscience, the term intention in action has 
been replaced by the term motor intention (Jeannerod, 
1994; Becchio et al., 2006). Note that the causal order of 
prior and motor intentions from a first person perspective 
is reversed in typical ToM paradigms from a third person 
perspective. Whereas a prior intention logically and 
temporally precedes the motor intention in the first 
person perspective (e.g., in Dante’s Inferno, Minos 
intends to send the damned to their place in Hell and 
hence girds himself with his tail), in the third person 
perspective prior intentions are inferred after the action 
has been observed (e.g., Dante, from the fact that Minos 
girds himself with his tail, infers that Minos intend to 
send the damned to their proper circle). The purpose of 
this work is to examine how human beings infer prior 
intentions after the observation of others’ actions, and 
not to discuss how people read motor intention. 
We propose a distinction between prior intentions 
along two dimensions: the kind of the goal (private or 
social), and the presence or absence of sharedness of the 
goal pursued by the agents. This means that, starting 
from a specific observation of an action, we can infer 
two kind of prior intentions: private intention and social 
intention. Social intention and private intention differ 
with respect to the nature of the inherent goal.  
Private intentions (PInt) elicit the representation of a 
private goal. We define private goal as a goal in which 
no other but the actor is involved in the satisfaction of 
the goal. 
Social intentions elicit the representation of a social 
goal. We define social goal as the goal of an actor (A) in 
which at least one other person (B) is implied for the 
satisfaction of the goal. Within social intentions we can 
distinguish between present interaction and prospective 
interaction. When A and B are currently interacting the 
social goal is shared. The prototypical example of this 
kind of social intention is communicative intention 
(CInt), i.e. the intention to communicate a meaning to 
someone else plus the intention that this intention should 
be recognized by the addressee (Bara, 2006; Grice, 
1975). Social intentions elicit the representation of a 
social goal also when A and B are not currently 
interacting, but when B is part of A’s goal. In this latter 
situation the social goal is not shared at the moment and 
the interaction is prospective in future. We shall use for 
this kind of social intention the label prospective social 
intention (PSInt). 
Starting from these conceptual distinctions, we 
devised an experimental protocol able to clarify the role 
of each brain region of the ToM network in understanding 
others’ prior intentions.  
Methods 
Twelve right-handed volunteers (six female; age range = 
19-27; M = 24.75; SD = 2.63) were recruited. A detailed 
description of our experimental design is given in Walter 
et al. (2004). In short, we presented cartoons involving a 
sequence of three pictures (story phase). The story phase 
was followed by a choice-phase during which three 
possible solutions were displayed simultaneously. The 
task of the participant was to select the logical story 
ending. For each of the four conditions (PInt, PSInt, CInt, 
and the control condition Physical Causality) eleven 
comic strips were presented, making up a total of 44 
trials. fMRI data were acquired using a 1.5 Tesla Siemens 
Magnetom Symphony whole-body MRI-System. 
Results 
The signal time course revealed specific signal time 
patterns for each region and condition. In Precuneus there 
was a highly significantly BOLD increase in all three 
intentional conditions compared to the control condition. 
The same was true for right pSTS. The time course 
analysis of the aPCC showed a significant increasing 
BOLD response only to both social intentions (PSInt and 
CInt). No significant response was observed in the private 
intention condition, PInt. Comparing both hemispheres 
directly we found the right pSTS to be significantly more 
activated than the left pSTS in the PSInt and PInt 
conditions. In contrast, in the CInt condition both pSTS 
were activated in a similar way, i.e. showed no difference 
in activation strength. 
Discussion 
In this work we analyse the contribution of four key 
regions of the ToM network (aPCC, Precuneus, right 
pSTS, and left pSTS) in the comprehension of different 
kinds of prior intentions. Based on our results, we propose 
a neurocognitive framework for reading other’s 
intentions. Our assumption is that this ability occurs in 
different modalities according both to the kind of goal 
involved (private or social) and to the presence or absence 
of sharedness of the goal pursued. 
The main result we find is that the ToM network shows 
different activation patterns in relation to the nature of the 
intentions the participant must deal with. Only the 
comprehension of a social intention with a shared goal 
(CInt) recruits all the four main areas described above. 
Instead, the comprehension of a social intention without a 
shared goal (PSInt) recruits the right pSTS, Precuneus and 
the aPCC. Furthermore, the comprehension of a private 
intention (PInt) involved only the activation of the 
Precuneus and right pSTS. Finally, this network shows 
specific activation patterns that differentiate the role 
between the left and the right pSTS, respectively. 
In literature two different key brain regions have been 
proposed at the core of the Theory of Mind competence: 
the aPCC, as part of the MPFC (Gallagher et al., 2002), 
and the right pSTS (Saxe & Wexler, 2005). Our results 
confirm the crucial role of both of these areas but suggest 
that they are differentially involved accordingly to the 
nature of the prior intention represented. Whereas the 
right pSTS with the Precuneus is necessary for all types of 
prior intentions, the aPCC and left pSTS are crucial for 
social and communicative intentions, respectively.  
Introducing a theoretical distinction able to differentiate 
intentions according to the dimensions of private versus 
social, and shared versus not shared, we have 
demonstrated the progressive recruitment of the network 
along these dimensions. Our approach allows to re-
interpret the seemingly contradictory findings in the 
literature within an integrative framework. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This work was supported by MIUR of Italy (cofin 2005, 
protocol n. 2005119758_004) and by Regione Piemonte 
(Bando regionale per la ricerca scientifica 2004, cod. 
A239). 
 
References 
Bara, B. G. (2006). Cognitive Pragmatics. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Becchio, C., Adenzato, M., & Bara, B. G. (2006). How 
the brain understands intention: Different neural circuits 
identify the componential features of motor and prior 
intentions. Consciousness and Cognition. 
DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2005.03.006. 
Gallagher, H. L., Jack, A. I., Roepstorff, A., & Frith, C. 
D. (2002). Imaging the intentional stance in a 
competitive game. Neuroimage, 16, 814-821. 
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & 
J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics. Speech Acts 
(pp. 41-58). New York and London: Academic Press. 
Jeannerod, M. (1994). The representing brain: Neural 
correlates of motor intention and imagery. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 17, 187-245. 
Pacherie, E. (2000). The content of intentions. Mind & 
Language, 15, 400-432. 
Saxe, R., & Wexler, A. (2005). Making sense of another 
mind: the role of the right temporoparietal junction. 
Neuropsychologia, 43, 1391-1399. 
Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. An essay in the 
philosophy of mind. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Walter, H., Adenzato, M., Ciaramidaro, A., Enrici, I., Pia, 
L., & Bara, B. G. (2004). Understanding intentions in 
social interaction: The role of the anterior paracingulate 
cortex. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 1854-
1863. 
 
